Is a Delayed Result a Just Result? The Use of Laches as an Equitable Defense to Remedial Back Pay Under the EEOC\u27s Sovereignty by Ruth Ann Mueller
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 67 
Issue 4 Fall 2018 Article 11 
12-19-2018 
Is a Delayed Result a Just Result? The Use of Laches as an 
Equitable Defense to Remedial Back Pay Under the EEOC's 
Sovereignty 
Ruth Ann Mueller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ruth Ann Mueller, Is a Delayed Result a Just Result? The Use of Laches as an Equitable Defense to 
Remedial Back Pay Under the EEOC's Sovereignty, 67 Cath. U. L. Rev. 787 (2018). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol67/iss4/11 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
Is a Delayed Result a Just Result? The Use of Laches as an Equitable Defense to 
Remedial Back Pay Under the EEOC's Sovereignty 
Erratum 
corrected header 
This notes is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol67/iss4/11 
 787 
IS A DELAYED RESULT A JUST RESULT? THE USE 
OF LACHES AS AN EQUITABLE DEFENSE TO 
REMEDIAL BACK PAY UNDER THE EEOC’S 
SOVEREIGNTY 
Ruth Ann Mueller 
Unlike private litigants, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) does not face a statute of limitations when litigating claims for alleged 
Title VII violations.1  Instead, the EEOC can file suit against an employer, and 
recover for both an individual’s private claim and the broader public interest 
affected by the individual’s claim, many years after the alleged discrimination 
occurred.2  This freedom causes practical implications for employers, such as 
record retention issues, impaired memory of employees, and witness 
unavailability.3   These factors greatly lengthen the amount of time between 
filing the claim and case dismissal, which can increase the amount of back pay 
to be pursued against an employer.4  Without a firm time bar, employers tend to 
resort to the time-honored equitable defense of laches.5  This Note explores 
whether an employer may raise this defense as a matter of law and overcome the 
presumption that laches cannot be used against the arm of the sovereign, 
specifically when the EEOC pursues back pay as a remedy.6 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972 (“Title VII” or “Act”), prohibits an employer from 
discriminating based on race, sex, national origin, or religion.7  In 1972, 
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 1. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (exhibiting that the plain language of the statute 
does not contain a statute of limitations); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 360 
(1977). 
 2. See Mary Lynn Kelly, Preventing Trial by Ambush: The Laches Defense in Title VII Suits, 
8 REV. LITIG. 227, 228 (1989). 
 3. E.g., EEOC v. SWMW Mgmt., Inc., No. CV-08-0946-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 1097543, at 
*10 (D. Ariz. April 22, 2009). 
 4. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 230–31. 
 5. E.g., SWMW Mgmt., 2009 WL 1097543, at *15–16 n.2. 
 6. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 233–34. 
 7. T itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012). 
It  shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to [1] fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or [2] to limit, segregate, 
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Congress delegated enforcement authority to the EEOC.8  This delegation did 
not include a definitive statute of limitations for the EEOC to initiate claims 
against a private employer.9  Congress remedied the recovery issue by amending 
the statute in 1991 to include recovery by a complaining party, which includes 
both private employees and the EEOC, for compensatory and punitive 
damages.10 
Because federal agencies face large caseloads with limited resources and the 
types of cases presented under the Act require meticulous review of an 
employer’s practices, as well as an investigation of employee and witness-
employee testimony, alleged unreasonable delay often occurs between a 
discrimination cause of action and the EEOC filing suit.11  The EEOC protects 
the overall societal right to freedom from discrimination, and may be exempt 
from facing the laches defense under sovereign immunity.12  Despite this, some 
courts have allowed the use of laches against the EEOC by reviewing the facts 
                                                 
or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin. 
§ 2000e-2(a). 
 8. Wesley Kobylak, Laches or Other Assertion of Untimeliness As Defense To Action Under 
Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.) brou ght by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission , 67 A.L.R. Fed. 381, § 2[a] (1984). 
 9. Id. § 3[a].  Having a statute of limitations creates a stable and clear understanding of the 
deadline for when a suit  must be filed.  See Tandy Corp. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 769 F.2d 362, 
365 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), (d)(1)(A).  “ [T]hese statutes unambiguously authorize the 
EEOC to obtain the relief that it  seeks in its complaint if it  can prove its case against [the] 
respondent.” EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 287 (2002).  There are limits on 
compensatory and punitive damages depending on the size of the employer: 
Compensatory damages pay victims for out -of-pocket expenses caused by the 
discrimination (such as costs associated with a job search or medical expenses) and 
compensate them for any emotional harm suffered (such as mental anguish,  
inconvenience, or loss of enjoyment of life).  Punitive damages may be awarded to punish 
an employer who has committed an especially malicious or reckless act of discrimination. 
. . . For employers with 15-100 employees, the limit is $50,000.  For employers with 101-
200 employees, the limit is $100,000.  For employers with 201-500 employees, the limit 
is $200,000.  For employers with more than 500 employees, the limit is $300,000. 
Remedies for Employment Discrimination , U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/remedies.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).  
 11. E.g., Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961); EEOC v. Marquez Bros. Int’l, 
Inc., No. 1:17-CV-44 AWI-EPG, 2018 WL 3197796, at *6–7 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2018).  The 
website for the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission lists the general t ime 
requirements for filing discrimination actions.  See generally Time Limits For Filing A Charge, 
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/timeliness.cfm (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 12. See Kobylak, supra note 8, § 2[a], § 3[d]. 
Fall 2018] Is a Delayed Result a Just Result? 789 
through the lens of a private individual’s cause of action against a defendant 
employer.13 
The use of laches in the United States has roots in the courts of equity in 
England, where a defendant could assert an affirmative defense against a dated 
claim.14  It is traditionally established by a two-prong test: unreasonable delay 
and material prejudice to the defendant.15   Although the defense of laches is 
predominately utilized in private, equitable suits, there is less certainty in its use 
against the federal agencies in the United States.16  Case law generally follows 
the English proposition that laches cannot be used against the king (or 
sovereign).17  Alternatively, some courts have interpreted the availability of the 
use of laches against the United States government and administrative agencies 
                                                 
 13. Id. § 3[c]. 
 14. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 6 (2018); see generally 30A C.J.S Equity § 4 (2018) (“ [W]hen a court 
exercises its equity powers . . . a court ’s duty is to do complete justice between the parties to the 
action.”).  The equitable courts within the United States are “ remedial,” not “ inquisitorial.”  Id.  
Therefore, their purpose is not to create a cause of action.  Id.  “A court of equity moves upon [the] 
considerations of conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence.”  Whittington v. Dragon Grp., 
LLC, 991 A.2d 1, 8 (Del. 2009) (quoting Reid v. Spazio, 970 A.2d 176, 183 (Del. 2009)). 
 15. See Kobylak, supra note 8, § 3[a]. 
 16. See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 147 (2018). 
Thus, in the context of a defense based on laches, delay is not a bar unless it  works to the 
disadvantage or prejudice of other parties.  Where no one has been harmed in any legal 
sense and the situation has not materially changed, the delay is not fatal. 
 
Thus, even 
where impermissible delay is present under the circumstances presented, if the delay has 
not prejudiced the party asserting the laches defense, it  will not bar the equitable action.
  
Furthermore, a party cannot assert the defense of laches if he or she actually benefited 
from the delay. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 17. Charles Alan Wright et al., Litigation Advantages of the United States, 14 FED. PRAC. & 
PROC. JURIS. § 3652 (4th ed. 2017). 
The rule quod nullum tempus occurrit  regi—that the sovereign is exempt from the 
consequences of its laches, and from the operation of statutes of limitations—appears to 
be a vestigial survival of the prerogative of the Crown . . . . But whether or not that alone 
accounts for its origin, the source of its continuing vitality where the royal privilege no 
longer exists is to be found in the public policy now underlying the rule even though it  
may in the beginning have had a different policy basis . . . . “The true reason . . . is to be 
found in the great public policy of preserving the public rights, revenues, and property 
from injury and loss, by the negligence of public officers.  And though this is sometimes 
called a prerogative right, it  is in fact nothing more than a reservation, or exception, 
introduced for the public benefit , and equally applicable to all governments.” Story, J., 
in United States v. Hoar, C.C.D.Mass.1821, 26 Fed.Cas. p. 329, 330 , No. 15373.  
Regardless of the form of government and independently of the royal prerogative once 
thought sufficient to justify it , the rule is supportable now because its benefit  and 
advantage extend to every citizen, including the defendant, whose plea of  laches or 
limitation it  precludes; and its uniform survival in the United States has been generally 
accounted for and justified on grounds of policy rather than upon any inherited notions 
of the personal privilege of the king. 
Id. 
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based on the EEOC’s protection of private rights.18  The question is whether the 
EEOC acts in the place of the private individual when litigating on his or her 
behalf, or in the position of the U.S. government as the sovereign who carries 
enforcement authority.  The issue of back pay for an employee continues to fall 
between the line of a private individual’s right and the collective rights of 
workers protected by the EEOC. 
This Note will first discuss the process an individual follows when filing a 
complaint with the EEOC and how many procedural deadlines do not affect the 
EEOC’s right to sue an employer.  Part II discusses the general use of laches 
against the United States government and how its adoption from English 
common law occurred.  Part III discusses the significance and timeliness that the 
availability of laches has upon the relationship between the EEOC, private 
employees, and private employers.  Part IV analyzes how courts determine the 
availability of laches, which scenarios give cause to assert laches against the 
EEOC, and how an inadequate employer defense could increase back pay 
liability. 
I. HOW AN EMPLOYEE’S PRIVATE TITLE VII CHARGE BECOMES A PUBLIC 
ISSUE 
Although the statute does not provide for a specific limitation period for the 
EEOC to file suit against an employer, private litigants must comply with 
specific deadlines as a condition to bringing suit under the Act.19  An aggrieved 
employee must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days from the day that 
discrimination took place.20  The EEOC then serves notice upon the employer 
within ten days of the employee’s charge.21  This is merely a deadline to provide 
notice of the charge and is not a bar against the EEOC from filing a subsequent 
lawsuit.22 
                                                 
 18. See generally Martin v. Consultants & Adm’rs, Inc., 966 F.2d 1078, 1100–01 (7th Cir. 
1992) (Posner, J., concurring); Wright et al., supra note 17 (“Some lower courts have questioned 
whether the Government ’s immunity from the defense of laches should be confined to core 
sovereign functions, and not extended to suits involving the enforcement of federal programs that 
involve commercial matters, such as loans and mortgages.”).  But see Guar. Trust Co. v. United 
States, 304 U.S. 126, 132–33 (1938). 
[T]he rule . . . that the sovereign is exempt from the consequences of its laches, and from 
the operation of [federal] statutes of limitations [survives on the ground of public policy 
rather than of royal prerogative and is] deemed an exception to local statutes of 
limitations where the government . . . is not expressly included . . . .  
Id. 
 19. See Time Limits for Filing a Charge, supra note 11. 
 20. Id. 
 21. What You Can Expect After a Charge is Filed , U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/process.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).  
 22. Id. 
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The EEOC may conduct an investigation to determine if “reasonable cause 
[exists] to believe that the [employee’s] charge is true . . . .”23  This decision 
occurs no later than 120 days from filing the charge.24  If, after this initial 
investigation, the EEOC determines that reasonable cause does not exist, the 
EEOC will issue an administrative dismissal.25  A notice of administrative 
dismissal is sent to both the employer and employee; a right-to-sue letter for 
administrative dismissals accompanies an employee’s dismissal notice.26  If 
reasonable cause exists, the EEOC will pursue “informal methods of conference, 
conciliation, and persuasion” before filing a lawsuit.27  Essentially, the EEOC 
must give the employer the opportunity to reach a resolution with the agency 
before resorting to the courts.28  If conciliation does not occur, the EEOC can 
bring forth a lawsuit anytime “thirty days after the filing of the charge.”29  If a 
party’s charge is not dismissed, settled, or litigated by the EEOC within 180 days 
after the initial charge filing, the employee may pursue a private action.30  
Therefore, a private litigant does not lose the ability to file a lawsuit despite a 
failed conciliation or time period expiration.31 
The EEOC’s ability to sue an employer for Title VII claims rests within its 
sovereign power as a federal agency, and is not based upon whether a private 
litigant initiates a complaint.32  Although an employer can use the 
aforementioned deadlines and procedures as a guideline to potential scenarios 
when defending Title VII lawsuits, the EEOC, in the position of the sovereign, 
retains the right to sue an employer at any time.33 
                                                 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012); see Kelly, supra note 2, at 229 (quoting § 2000e-5(b)). 
 24. See Elinor A. Swanson, A Textualist Approach to Title VII: Aggrieved Individuals May 
Bypass The EEOC, 32 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP . L.J. 345, 352 (2015); Kelly, supra note 2, at 229. 
 25. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.017(a)(1) (2016).  An agency must dismiss a claim that: fails to state 
a claim under 29 CFR § 1614.03 or 29 CFR § 1614.106(a), or “states the same claim that is pending 
before or has been decided by the agency or the Commission.”  Id.  Preserving Access to the Legal 
System: Common Errors By Federal Agencies In Dismissing Complaints of Discrimination on 
Procedural Grounds, EEOC 4–5 (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/federal/reports/dismi  
ssals.cfm#II. 
 26. What You Can Expect After a Charge is Filed , supra note 21. 
 27. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 229–30; see What You Can Expect After a Charge is Filed , 
supra note 21. 
 28. What You Can Expect After a Charge is Filed , supra note 21. 
 29. Kelly, supra note 2, at 229. 
 30. Id. at  229–30. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See What You Can Expect After a Charge is Filed , supra note 21. 
 33. See Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.g 
ov/employees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (explaining that the EEOC enjoys the 
discretion as to if and when to bring a lawsuit). 
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II. DISAGREEMENT OVER SOVEREIGN CAPACITY LEADS TO UNCERTAINTY 
OVER LACHES USE 
A. Adoption of Laches and Its Two Prongs Within United States Courts 
The rule that the king is not bound by a statute of limitations extends from the 
English common law relationship between the sovereign and the public.34  In 
adopting this ideal, the United States Supreme Court found that “[i]t was deemed 
important that, while the sovereign was engrossed by the cares and duties of his 
office, the public should not suffer by the negligence of his servants.”35  Courts 
have steadfastly adopted this rule in the United States, adhering to the idea that 
the sovereign “cannot be expected to look over each individual citizen because 
his duty is to the population as a whole,” and “the [sovereign] should not be 
penalized for the negligence of his officers.”36   Courts have found it to be good 
policy in restricting use of laches against the government because the sovereign 
protects the public good.37  In the past thirty years, courts have loosened this rule 
in varying situations.38  Judicial leaders, such as Judge Richard Posner, have 
stated, “[G]overnment suits in equity are subject to the principles of equity, 
laches is generally and we think correctly assumed to be applicable to suits by 
government agencies as well as by private parties.”39 
Under United States law, the party who asserts the affirmative defense of 
laches carries the burden of proof with respect to unreasonable delay and 
material prejudice to the employer.40  Unreasonable delay begins when a party 
knows (or should have known) about the defendant’s actions and continues until 
the plaintiff actually files suit against the defendant.41  Prejudice is never 
                                                 
 34. Guar. Tr. Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938) (“But whether or not that alone 
accounts for its origin, the source of its continuing vitality where the royal privilege no longer exists 
is to be found in the public policy now underlying the rule even though it  may in the beginning 
have had a different policy basis.”). 
 35. United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489 (1879).  
 36. An Nguyen, Note, It’s About Time: Reconsidering Whether Laches Should Lie Against 
the Government, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 2111, 2128 (2015). 
 37. Id. at  2129. 
 38. United States v. Admin. Enters., Inc., 46 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1995).  In this case, the 
Seventh Circuit advised that laches may be used against the government in “suits against the 
government in which . . . there is no statute of limitations” or the government ’s enforcement of 
“what are the nature of private rights . . . .”  Id. 
 39. NLRB v. P*I*E Nationwide, 894 F.2d 887, 894 (1990).  
 40. See Kobylak, supra note 8, § 3[a]. 
 41. Id.; see HENRY T HOMAS BANNING, T HE LAW OF THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS: 
T OGETHER WITH SOME OBSERVATIONS ON T HE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF LACHES (OR DELAY) 
AND ACQUIESCENCE 229 (3d ed. 1906) (“ It  is an accepted maxim of equity, that delay defeats 
equitable rights (5); and even a comparatively short delay, which is not satisfactory accounted for, 
tells heavily against a plaintiff . . . .”). 
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches, and each case must be determined 
according to its own particular circumstances.  In other words, the question of laches is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.  Since laches is an equitable doctrine, its 
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assumed, and the party who asserts the defense carries the burden of proof with 
respect to these two prongs.42  Ultimately, “[t]he mere passage of time will not 
give rise to an inference of prejudice . . .” because there must be a “resultant 
injury or prejudice by reason of the delay, or a change in the condition of the 
property or relations of the parties rendering it . . . .”43 
B. The Beginning of Judicial Sidestepping Around Laches Use 
The United States affirmatively considered the use of laches against the 
sovereign in Costello v. United States.44  Frank Costello, an illegal bootlegger, 
applied for citizenship in 1925.45  Costello fraudulently indicated that he worked 
in real estate both on his naturalization application and to his naturalization 
examiner.46  Costello admitted to a government agent in 1938 that he engaged 
in illegal bootlegging between 1923 and 1931.47  Costello admitted his 
involvement in the conspiracy on two separate occasions before a grand jury in 
1939 and again in 1943.48  The United States filed suit against Costello in 1952, 
and subsequently revoked his citizenship in 1959.49 
                                                 
application is controlled by equitable considerations.  Laches cannot be invoked to defeat 
justice, and it  will be applied where, and only where, the enforcement of the right asserted 
would work injustice. 
30A C.J.S Equity § 142 (2018). 
 42. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 147 (2018). 
 43. Id.; Guar. Tr. Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938); see Irwin v. Dep’t  of Veteran 
Affairs, 489 U.S. 89, 98 (1990) (“Not only is the Court’s holding inconsistent with our traditional 
approach to cases involving sovereign immunity, it  directly overrules a prior decision by this 
court.”).  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 74 (1982). 
The relevant factors in denying relief to which an applicant is prima facie entitled include 
undue delay, possible prejudice to the winner of the judgment, and protection of interests 
of innocent third persons.  Undue delay and prejudice to the judgment winner merge into 
each other.  While delay in assertion of a claim does not as such produce adverse 
consequences, it  can induce a sense of repose that itself may become a protectable 
interest.  Correlatively, the likelihood and extent of reliance on a judgment, or of change 
in conditions, increases as time passes after the judgment ’s rendition. 
Id.  See generally BANNING, supra note 41, at 231–232. 
“Standing by” is a specific laches,—although it  is, more usually, a species of 
acquiescence: And the effect of it , where the position of the defendant has been materially 
altered as a consequence of it , will be to prevent the plaintiff’s equitable right from being 
enforceable . . . In every case, it  must be remembered, that the fraudulent conduct 
continues valid until the plaintiff has elected to avoid it  . . . .  
Id. 
 44. 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961); see also Kelly, supra note 2, at 235. 
 45. Costello, 365 U.S. at 267. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at  273. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at  266. 
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Costello argued that the twenty-seven year delay between his filing for 
citizenship and the government’s suit against him prejudiced his defense.50  
Whether or not undue delay occurred in the proceeding, the Court held that 
Costello did not experience prejudice due to the delay.51  Rather, the Court 
decided that any probable prejudice would burden the government rather than 
Costello by bringing the suit twenty-seven years later and thus, diminishing the 
memories of the United States’ witnesses.52 
Ultimately, the Court rejected Costello’s use of laches.53  Despite a 
willingness to open the door to Costello’s laches defense, the Court did not 
affirmatively decide whether laches could be used against the government since 
Costello could not satisfy laches’ two-prong requirements.54 
C. The Use of Laches Against the EEOC’s Right to Litigate on Behalf of the 
Public Interest in EEOC-Initiated Cases 
The guiding case with respect to laches and EEOC-initiated cases is 
Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC.55  The EEOC sued an insurance 
company that discriminated against an employee under Title VII.56  It filed suit 
more than three years after the employee filed a complaint with the EEOC and 
more than five months after conciliation efforts between the parties ended.57  The 
issue before the court was whether a state statute of limitation could be invoked 
to limit the amount of time the EEOC had to bring forth a claim.58 
The Court held that there is not a mandatory 180-day limit upon the EEOC to 
bring forth a Title VII suit.59  Rather, the Court determined the statute allows an 
initiating party whose claim has not been dismissed, settled, or litigated by the 
EEOC to bring forth a lawsuit after the 180 days.60  Within this holding, the 
Court determined that state statute of limitations cannot be used to limit the time 
                                                 
 50. Id. at  268. 
 51. Id. at  282–83. 
 52. Id. at  283. 
 53. Id. at  281, 284. 
 54. Id. at  281–84. 
 55. 432 U.S. 355, 355–57 (1977).  See Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 
789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Consequently, when considering the timeliness of a cause of action 
brought pursuant to a statute for which Congress has provided a limitations period, a court should 
not apply laches to overrule the legislature’s judgment as to the appropriate time limit t o apply for 
actions brought under the statute.”).  But see Guar. Tr. Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132–33 
(1938) (stating “ [t]he rule that the sovereign is exempt from the consequences of its laches, and 
from the operation of [federal] statutes of limitations . . .” survives on the ground of public policy 
rather than of royal prerogative and is “deemed . . . an exception to local statutes of limitations 
where the government . . . is not expressly included . . . .”). 
 56. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 358. 
 57. Id. at  357–58. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at  361. 
 60. Id. 
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that the EEOC may take to bring an enforcement action, nor is there any time 
limit the EEOC must follow.61  Such a limitation would hinder the policy that 
requires Title VII claims to be both investigated and potentially resolved by the 
EEOC before litigation, and also would contradict congressional intent.62 
The Court determined that defendants would not be subjected to unfairness or 
prejudice by an “artificial” limitation period,63 reasoning that: 
The absence of inflexible time limitations on bringing of lawsuits will 
not, as the [defendant] asserts, deprive defendants in Title VII civil 
actions of fundamental fairness or subject them to surprise and 
prejudice that can result from the prosecution of stale claims . . . 
[However,] when a Title VII defendant is in fact prejudiced by a 
private plaintiff’s unexcused conduct of a particular case, the trial 
court may restrict or even deny back pay relief.  The same 
discretionary power “to locate []a just result’s in light of the 
circumstances peculiar to the case,” can also be exercised when the 
EEOC is the plaintiff.64 
In United States v. Administrative Enterprises, Inc. ,65 Judge Posner laid out 
several possible solutions to the use of laches against the government.66  One 
solution was to limit its use to suits that protected a private, rather than a public 
right.67  Posner previously toyed with this idea in Martin v. Consultants & 
Administrators, Inc.68  Martin represents a scenario where a federal agency 
(Department of Labor) may protect both private and public rights, but the dispute 
at issue does not affect the agency’s sovereignty (individual fund claims), and 
must be analyzed as if the claim involved private litigants.69  Specifically, the 
trustees of a health and welfare fund argued that the DOL’s suit against them 
regarding the “viability of certain claims” for specific individuals’ retirement 
accounts were barred by laches.70  The trustees cited Occidental Life Insurance 
Co. to show that courts have loosened the laches rule in regard to the EEOC 
when litigating on behalf of an individual’s rights.71  The trustees analogized this 
argument to individual funded claims, rather than government funded claims 
within its own fund.72 
                                                 
 61. Id. at  368–69. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at  364. 
 64. Id. at  372–73. 
 65. 46 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 66. Id. at  672–73; see United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489 (1935) (“Laches within the 
term of the statute of limitations is no defense at law.”). 
 67. Admin. Enters., Inc., 46 F.3d at 673. 
 68. 966 F.2d 1078, 1100–01 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 69. Id. at  1100. 
 70. Id. at  1082–83. 
 71. Id. at  1090. 
 72. Id. 
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The trustees argued, and the court agreed, that the lawsuit affected the 
employees’ private rights because the dispute rested within individual employee 
funds.73  As Judge Posner stated: 
In an ERISA suit . . . the invoking of laches to bar the government’s 
suit would not take money out of the U.S. Treasury or interfere with 
the government’s operations.  It would not even deprive the 
government of a financial expectancy. Any money it won in this case 
would be paid into the pension plans against which the defendants 
committed a breach of trust.74 
Although courts and judicial leaders continue to wrestle with the EEOC’s 
balance between public and private rights, the Supreme Court last tackled the 
issue in-depth in the 2002 ruling of EEOC v. Waffle House.75  Here, the EEOC 
filed suit for victim-specific relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
which receives its enforcement procedures from Title VII when enforcing 
employment discrimination.76  The Court reviewed whether the EEOC could 
pursue victim-specific relief from an employer after the charging employee 
signed an arbitration agreement with the employer.77 
The Court recognized the changes of enforcement power from the 
aforementioned 1991 amendments to the statute.78  The Court disagreed with the 
lower court’s view that only when the EEOC seeks “broad” relief does the 
“public interest” overcome private interest goals.79  Rather, the Court held that 
                                                 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at  1101. 
 75. 534 U.S. 279, 284–85 (2002). 
 76. Id. at  282; 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2012). 
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in  sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-
6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this tit le shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this 
subchapter provides to the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to any person 
alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of any provision of this 
chapter, or regulations promulgated under section 12116 of this tit le, concerning 
employment. 
Id.; see BANNING, supra note 41, at 229 (“ It  is an accepted maxim of equity, that delay defeats 
equitable rights (5); and even a comparatively short delay, which is not satisfactory accounted for, 
tells heavily against a plaintiff . . . .”). 
 77. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 282. 
 78. Id. at 287.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1). 
In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000e-5, 2000e-16] against a respondent who engaged in 
unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because 
of its disparate impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act [42 U.S.C. 
2000e-2, 2000e-3, 2000e-16], and provided that the complaining party cannot recover 
under section 1981 of this tit le, the complaining party may recover compensatory and 
punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief 
authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.  
Id. 
 79. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 290. 
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the EEOC’s strong policy enforcement considerations do not limit the remedies 
available to the EEOC.80  The validity of the EEOC’s claims for such remedies, 
or the type of relief sought when such private agreements are signed, remains an 
open issue.81 
III. THE REVIEW OF LACHES AND ITS EFFECT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE EEOC, PRIVATE EMPLOYEES, AND PRIVATE EMPLOYERS FOLLOWS 
CURRENT JUDICIAL CONCERNS 
A. Higher Court Action Demonstrates Laches’ Timeliness in Federal Cases 
Minimal guidance can be found in other areas of law with respect to EEOC-
initiated Title VII cases.82  In SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality 
Baby Products, LLC, the Supreme Court reviewed the extent to which laches 
can be used in patent infringement cases and how that may affect ongoing relief, 
such as damages.83  The Court held that laches cannot be an affirmative defense 
under the Patent Act’s six-year limitations period.84  Unlike Title VII claims, 
Congress codified limitations periods within the patent statutes, and therefore 
parties to these cases do not face the same uncertainty as the EEOC and private 
employers with respect to laches.85 
A more appropriate analogy may be found in the United States’ 
denaturalization caseload.  Similar to Title VII claims, there is no statute of 
limitations when litigating denaturalization cases.  The Ninth Circuit recently 
addressed the issue in this context in United States v. Arango.86  Fernando 
Arango, a fraudulent green card holder, argued that the United States knew about 
his involvement in a green card marriage fraud conspiracy, yet waited twenty 
years until filing suit against him.87  The Ninth Circuit did not affirmatively 
address the issue of laches because Arango failed to prove “lack of diligence by 
                                                 
 80. Id. at  292–93.  But see id. at  298 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Absent explicit  statutory 
authorization . . . I cannot agree that the EEOC may do on behalf of an employee that which an 
employee has agreed not to do for himself.”). 
 81. Id. at  297 (“ It  is an open question whether a settlement or arbitration judgement would 
affect the validity of the EEOC[] . . . .”). 
 82. See generally SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag, v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. 
Ct. 954, 959 (2017); United States v. Arango, 686 F. App’x. 489, 491 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 83. SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag , 137 S. Ct. at 965–66. 
 84. Id. at  967.  The Court considered the following question: “Whether and to what extent the 
defense of laches may bar a claim for patent infringement brought within the Patent Act ’s six-year 
statutory limitations period, 35 U.S.C. § 286.”  Dennis Crouch, Supreme Court to Review (and 
likely Reject) Laches as a Defense in Patent Infringement Cases, PATENTLYO (May 2, 2016), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/05/supreme-defense-infringement.html. 
 85. See 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, no recovery shall be 
had for any infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or  
counterclaim for infringement in the action.”). 
 86. 686 F. App’x 489, 490 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 87. Brief for Appellee at 7, United States v. Arango, No. 10-15821, 2010 WL 6753360 (9th 
Cir. Dec. 29, 2010). 
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the government” at the trial court.88  Alternatively, the Sixth Circuit held in 
United States v. Mandcyz that laches may not be used in denaturalization cases 
“[b]ecause the United States act[s] in its sovereign capacity when it [seeks] to 
denaturalize [a plaintiff] . . . .”89  Unlike Title VII cases, where an administrative 
agency holds enforcement power, there is little question that the United States is 
acting as the sovereign when it denaturalizes an individual. 
Occidental Life Insurance Co. remains the key case for analysis purposes.  
Unfortunately, for guidance sake, the question presented before the Court in 
Occidental Life Insurance Co. did not address a laches defense, unlike 
Costello.90  Without a firm ruling on laches in employment discrimination cases, 
the aforementioned cases only add to the analysis, rather than provide a clear-
cut answer, to the availability of laches an employer may possess for Title VII 
relief in the EEOC context.  This lack of guidance leaves plaintiffs and 
defendants with mid-twentieth century case law pitted against late twentieth and 
early twenty-first century employment scenarios. 
B. Employers Should Use Costello Evidentiary Deficiencies Against Ongoing 
Relief 
Generally, disagreements over laches use begin when an individual timely 
files a complaint with the EEOC and chooses to wait for the EEOC to finalize 
its administrative processes, or decides to delay suit past the minimum 180-day 
waiting period.91  More often than not, the reason for delay in these cases is the 
EEOC’s claim backlog.92 
Employers who are defending stale claims often wrestle with the same 
evidentiary deficiencies analyzed in Costello that accompany the passage of 
time, such as documents destroyed in the ordinary course of business or 
unavailability of witnesses that naturally arises from employee turnover.93  
Private individuals defending delay on EEOC backlog grounds tend to be 
successful when they are able to prove that the EEOC was active during the 
administrative waiting game, rather than dormant or rendering “dilatory 
tactics.”94  “Mere passage of time” is not an indicator, but case law shows that 
under these fact patterns, suits filed even eight years after the initial complaint 
                                                 
 88. Arango, 686 F. App’x. at 490; e.g., United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135, 1143–44 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (“ It remains an open question in this circuit as to whether laches is a permissible defense 
to a denaturalization proceeding.”). 
 89. United States v. Mandycz, 447 F.3d 951, 964 (6th Cir. 2006).  
 90. Compare Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 357 (1977) with Costello v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281–82 (1961). 
 91. Kobylak, supra note 8, §§ 4–5. 
 92. Id. §§ 4, 6. 
 93. Id. § 3c. 
 94. Eric Matusewitch, If You Snooze You May Lose: Courts Are Ruling on Laches Defense, 
12 NO. 16 ANDRES EMP’T LITIG. REP . 3 (1998); Kobylak, supra note 8, § 3c. 
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can be considered reasonable.95  When cases of dormancy or “dilatory tactics” 
are proven, however, employers generally have been able to show prejudice due 
to the delay because of lack of witnesses and destroyed records due to in-place 
record retention policies.96  EEOC-initiated cases have found similar arguments, 
but less determinative outcomes.97 
C. The EEOC Must Continue to Rely on Occidental Life Insurance Co. for a 
Sound Sovereign Defense 
In addition to Costello, district and appellate courts continually use the 
guiding principle from Occidental Life Insurance Co. when deciding laches use 
against the EEOC in EEOC-initiated cases, despite the Court in  Occidental Life 
Insurance Co. not definitely handling a laches argument.98  When analyzed 
against Costello, these rulings provide a narrow window to interject a laches 
defense without sovereign immunity questions.99  Courts have permitted the use 
of laches against the EEOC despite potentially “protecting a public right” under 
these fact patterns.  However, none have set a threshold that must be met in order 
to properly establish a laches defense against the EEOC.100 
Ultimately, the EEOC still functions as an arm of the United States 
government, and carries the presumption of sovereign rule; an employer’s 
defense must jump over this hurdle.  As long as there are few Costello 
deficiencies, the EEOC should be able to protect its ability to reasonably pursue 
back pay for the public good. 
IV. HOW A FAILED LACHES DEFENSE CAN INCREASE AN EMPLOYER’S BACK 
PAY LIABILITY 
One of the more daunting prejudicial factors faced by an employer due to a 
prolonged delay is increased monetary liability.101  Back pay is the total lost 
earnings an employee incurs, including, but not limited to, “compensation or 
salary, overtime, premium pay and shift differentials, incentive pay, raises 
bonuses, lost sales commissions, cost-of-living increases, tips, medical and life 
insurance, fringe benefits, and pensions, stock awards and options.”102  The 
EEOC can pursue back pay under the “Make Whole Relief” doctrine, as 
                                                 
 95. Kobylak, supra note 8, §§ 3a, 3d, 6. 
 96. Id. § 3c. 
 97. Id. § 3d. 
 98. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 360 (1977); see, e.g., EEOC v. UPS, No. 
15-CV-4141, 2017 WL 2829513, at *31 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2017) (discussing how some courts 
might have found exceptions to the laches rule under Occidental and T itle VII).  
 99. Compare Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961) with Occidental Life Ins. 
Co., 432 U.S. at 374 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 100. Kobylak, supra note 8, § 5. 
 101. Id. §§ 3b, 3d. 
 102. U.S. Department of Labor DIR 2013-04, DEP’T OF LABOR 2 (July 17, 2013), https://ww 
w.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/directives/dir310.pdf. 
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characterized by the Department of Labor, for both victim-specific relief 
(Individual Relief) as well as class-wide relief without facing the class action 
requirements under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.103  A 
remedy under the “Make Whole Relief” doctrine restores a victim or victims to 
the position that they would have occupied if the discrimination did not take 
place.104  Generally, the EEOC can pursue back pay with interest under this 
approach.105  Back pay is within the equitable discretion of the court, and, while 
it may not result in a finding of material prejudice, that “does not eliminate the 
availability of the laches defense” based on the totality of prejudicial 
circumstances.106 
The EEOC’s discretion allows it to work for the collective workers’ interests 
(i.e., the public interest) in regards to a particular discrimination charge. 107  
Although this enforcement of a public right could close the door on an 
employer’s laches defense outright, courts have found more difficulty in a clear 
response.108  The narrower focus of laches’ use against prejudicial back pay 
renders limited, yet beneficial, advice for employers when facing a grow ing 
number of individuals that the EEOC could assert a lawsuit on behalf of over an 
undetermined number of years.109  Prejudice must be confined to the 
discriminatory allegation at hand, generalized prejudice may still occur despite 
documentary hurdles, but that is not enough for the remedy.110 
                                                 
 103. EEOC v. SMWM Mgmt., Inc., No. CV-08-0946-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 1097543, at *19 
(D. Ariz. April 21, 2009); Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980) (“When 
the EEOC acts, albeit  at the behest of and for the benefit  of specific individuals, it  acts also to 
vindicate the public interest in preventing employment discrimination.”). 
 104. U.S. Department of Labor DIR 2013-04, supra note 102, at 3. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Kobylak, supra note 8, § 2[a]; Smith v. Caterpillar, Inc., 358 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
 107. See United States v. R.I. Dep’t  of Corr., 81 F. Supp. 3d 182, 185 (D.R.I. 2015): 
[W]hen a T itle VII defendant is in fact prejudiced by a private plaintiff ’s unexcused 
conduct of a particular case, the trial court may restrict or even deny [back pay] relief . . 
. . The same discretionary power to locate a just result in light of the circumstances 
peculiar to the case, can also be exercised when the EEOC is the plaintiff.  
Id. at  192 n.12.; BANNING, supra note 41, at 229 (“It is an accepted maxim of equity, t hat delay 
defeats equitable rights (5); and even a comparatively short delay, which is not satisfactory 
accounted for, tells heavily against a plaintiff . . . .”). 
 108. See e.g., EEOC v. Alioto Fish Co., 623 F.2d 86, 88–89 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 109. E.g., EEOC v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1438, 1440–41 (M.D. Fl. 1988) 
(“Because of [the EEOC’s] representative role, the defense of laches is sometimes available against 
[it ,] although laches is not available against the United States when it  is acting in its sovereign 
capacity to enforce a public right or protect a public interest.”); EEOC v. Autozone, Inc., 258 F. 
Supp. 2d 822, 824–26 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).  The court decided not to limit back pay to 300 days 
before the filing of the discrimination charge.  Autozone, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 832. 
 110. See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 4 (2018). 
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A. There is No Definitive Threshold for Undue Delay 
The substantive reasons for a particular delay on behalf of the EEOC have 
found more traction for establishing the unreasonable delay prong than the 
length of time between action and filing, specifically during the conciliation and 
investigatory pre-lawsuit phases.111  Substantive backlog issues and lengthy 
delay tend to persuade courts to find for this first prong.112  District Courts 
continue to split on the issue of whether a delay is substantive enough, with 
minimal Circuit Court guidance. 
A lawsuit initiated five years after alleged discrimination may dangle between 
a finding for or against unreasonable delay.113  In EEOC v. Jacksonville 
Shipyards, Inc.,114 the court found a five-year delay between alleged 
discrimination and lawsuit initiation excusable because the EEOC deferred the 
case to a separate agency to conduct an audit.115  The court refused to find 
unreasonable delay because the claim remained active, even though audit 
deferment may not be the type of movement an employer considers 
reasonable.116  Alternatively, in EEOC v. Autozone,117 more than a five-year 
delay between the EEOC initial claim and lawsuit filing occurred.  Here, the 
actual duration between alleged action and lawsuit tipped the court in favor of 
the defendant.118  The court reviewed the case as three separate time periods with 
three separate delay assessments.119  The first segment, a two-and-half year 
period, consisted of the EEOC’s review of the applicant material and on-site 
inspections.120  The second segment, less than one year, consisted of two 
separate settlement conferences.121  Neither of these two periods exerted the 
unreasonable delay needed for laches.122  The third segment of the five-year 
period, which lasted less than two years, represented the most viable area where 
unfair delay may be imposed because conciliation efforts ended between the 
parties. 123  The court found in favor of unreasonable delay during this period 
because the EEOC neither presented a substantive backlog argument nor cited 
separate agency review of the documents.124 
                                                 
 111. See generally 30A C.J.S. Equity § 145 (2018). 
 112. E.g., Autozone, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 826. 
 113. Kobylak, supra note 8, § 3[c]. 
 114. 696 F. Supp. 1438 (M.D. Fl. 1988). 
 115. Id. at 1440. 
 116. Id. 
 117. 258 F. Supp. 2d 822 (W.D. Tenn. 2003). 
 118. Id. at  826–27. 
 119. Id. at  827. 
 120. Id.
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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The actual duration between events corresponds to an individual’s back pay 
calculation.125  Even when narrowly reviewing the right to back pay, courts tend 
to require more than mere durational accounts of general prejudice.126  In EEOC 
v. Alioto Fish Ltd.,127 the Ninth Circuit found that an administrative delay that 
caused a sixty-two month delay between charge filing and lawsuit filing 
naturally caused “substantial[] prejudice[] [to Alioto] in its defense of claims for 
back pay.”128  Similarly, one court granted summary judgment to the employer 
in EEOC v. Peterson, Howell, & Heather, Inc.129 after a sixty-three month delay 
during the investigatory and conciliation stages.130  The court reasoned: 
During . . . administrative delays, the back pay meter has been running, 
thus exposing the defendants to greater pecuniary losses . . . [T]he 
EEOC has dealt defendants [with] a double-fisted blow.  The passage 
of time has hindered the defendants in their ability to prevail on the 
merits while at the same time inflating the potential damages 
defendants face if they do not prevail.131 
The undue delay required for laches should also stem from the EEOC itself, 
not any extraneous entities.  In one of the few guiding Circuit Court decisions, 
the Fourth Circuit found that the trial court in EEOC v. Navy Federal Credit 
Union abused its discretion when it found in favor of the employer due to a four-
year delay during the EEOC’s investigatory phase of a Title VII retaliation 
claim.132  The EEOC cited the delay due to a “lack of diligence” by an 
independent agency charged with specific investigatory tasks.133  The defendant 
argued that the EEOC and the separate entity formed an agency relationship,  
placing liability on the EEOC.134  Rather, the Fourth Circuit held that the 
autonomous relationship between the two agencies cannot surmount to the type 
of undue delay required for laches against the EEOC.135  In this scenario, the 
EEOC cannot be responsible for an independent agency’s idleness.  
Occidental Life Insurance Co. permitted judicial discretion between 
unreasonable and reasonable delay in order to provide a “just result.”136  As the 
arm of the sovereign, the EEOC rightly has the power to enforce Title VII, 
                                                 
 125. U.S. Department of Labor DIR 2013-04, supra note 102, at 2. 
 126. See generally infra notes 127–135. 
 127. 623 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 128. Id. at  88–89. 
 129. 702 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Md. 1989). 
 130. Id. at  1221, 1228. 
 131. Id. at  1224. 
 132. EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 411 (4th Cir. 2005).  
 133. Id. at  409. 
 134. Id. at  409–10.  In discussing the differences between the two agencies, the Fourth Circuit 
discussed how “deferral agencies” under T itle VII “operate with substantial independence” despite 
potentially sharing “primary responsibility to enforce the civil rights laws.”  Id. 
 135. Id. at  411. 
 136. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 373 (1977).  
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despite a vague balancing act between unreasonable and reasonable delay.137  
The “double fisted blow” back pay relief can cause when assessing laches 
availability likely falls under Occidental Life Insurance Co.’s intent when 
allowing judicial discretion.138  So long as the facts satisfy laches’ material 
prejudice prong, Occidental Life Insurance Co. leaves room to allow a “just 
result” that neither steps on the EEOC’s jurisdiction nor hinders an employer’s 
ability to fairly defend against an unreasonable back pay calculation.139 
B. When Courts Refuse to Address Back Pay “Head On” Without Discovery 
When concrete examples of material prejudice are unavailable, employers 
may find more difficulty in obtaining what may be seen as a “just result” in 
limiting back pay through laches.140  In EEOC v. SWMW Management,141 the 
defendant argued that undue delay occurred throughout the EEOC’s 
investigatory and conciliation effort stages, ultimately causing “unfair[] 
accentuated potential monetary damages.”142  The employer cited difficulty in 
locating key witnesses, corporate structure changes, and high turnover of 
employees, including those employees in charge of record retention policies.143  
However, the employer did not establish a firm link between these factors and 
any actual prejudice as the court found these conditions existed before the filing 
of the discrimination charge.144  The court did not address the back pay issue 
head on, despite being one of the defendant’s main arguments, because neither 
side presented substantial evidence for the court to resolve the matter.145 
Similarly, the court in EEOC v. PBM Graphics, Inc.146 found the employer’s 
concern about monetary liability “premature” as neither party had yet conducted 
discovery.147  The employer had cited specific examples of witness 
unavailability after a six-year delay.148  However, because PBM Graphics could 
not discuss exactly what evidence was needed from the witnesses, or why 
affidavits from other employees were not sufficient, the court could not balance 
potential prejudicial factors against the apparent delay due to EEOC backlog.149  
Only two of the twelve employees at issue remained with the company.150  The 
                                                 
 137. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2012); see also Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 360. 
 138. See Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. 355 at 373. 
 139. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). 
 140. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. 355 at 360. 
 141. No. CV-08-0946-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 1097543 (D. Ariz. April 22, 2009).  
 142. Id. at  *14 n.2. 
 143. Id. at  *10. 
 144. Id. at  *11. 
 145. Id. at *21. 
 146. 877 F. Supp. 2d 334 (M.D.N.C. 2012). 
 147. Id. at  367. 
 148. Id. at  364. 
 149. Id. at 367. 
 150. Id. at  365. 
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court agreed that the employer was prejudiced, just not exactly how it had been 
prejudiced.151 
Courts came to similar conclusions in EEOC v. Lockheed Martin Global 
Telecommunications, Inc.152 and EEOC v. Jetstream Ground Services, Inc.153  
Although the court found that back pay could arguably be “the most prejudicial 
aspect” of the EEOC’s delay in Lockheed Martin Global Telecommunications, 
the court ordered discovery to allow the EEOC to develop its case theory more 
thoroughly.154  Back pay may have been prejudicial to Jetstream Ground 
Services, Inc., but the employer pointed to no other authority “which indicates 
that this factor alone suffices to show prejudice . . . .”155  Ultimately, an employer 
cannot rest on duration alone in order to effectively meet the burden of 
unreasonable delay against the EEOC.156  An employer must specifically define 
the type of prejudice exerted by the delay, otherwise broad prejudice will not 
suffice.157 
C. Record Retention Polices and Faded Memories are Not Enough to Limit 
Back Pay 
One of the biggest effects of laches against employees is the effect of delay 
on an employer’s routine, record retention policies, and unavailability of 
witnesses.158  Employers generally do not keep records past a certain time period 
due to both procedure and storage constraints.  The EEOC requires employers 
to retain personnel and employment records for at least one year, including 
records for terminated employees.159 
In industries with excessive turnover, such as transportation, packaging, and 
shipping services, a delay of even one year may render prejudice.160  Because 
“mere passage of time” is not a threshold, courts continue to question how undue 
                                                 
 151. Id. at  367–68. 
 152. 514 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D. Md. 2007). 
 153. 134 F. Supp. 3d 1298 (D. Colo. 2015). 
 154. Lockheed Martin Glob. Telecomm., 514 F. Supp. 2d at 805; see EEOC v. Am. Nat ’l Bank, 
574 F.2d 1173, 1176 (4th Cir. 1978) (Back pay must be “considered after the facts have been fully 
developed, if the commission ultimately prevails.”). 
 155. JetStream , 134 F. Supp. 3d at 1333 (“ [B]ecause backpay is an equitable remedy and 
subject to mitigation, the Court has the discretion to take the EEOC’s delay into account when 
fashioning a remedy.”). 
 156. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 228, 230–31. 
 157. Id. at  228–30. 
 158. See EEOC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 668 F.2d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Perhaps the 
greatest disagreement between the parties concerns the loss of records.”). 
 159. Recordkeeping Requirements, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ht 
tps://www.eeoc.gov/employers/recordkeeping.cfm (last visited Mar. 14, 2018) (“Regulations 
require that employees keep all personnel or employment records for one year.  If an employer is 
involuntarily terminated, his/her personnel records must be retained for one year from date of 
termination.”). 
 160. E.g., Dresser Indus., Inc., 668, F.2d at 1204. 
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delay may factor into employer fairness, ultimately affecting litigation fairness 
for both employer and employee.161  The need for witnesses must be narrowly 
confined to the discriminatory allegation at hand.  Prejudice may still occur 
despite these various hurdles, but general prejudice is not enough for an 
equitable remedy.162 
A telling example where an employer provided specific examples of witness 
availability as a prejudicial factor occurred in EEOC v. Dresser Industries, 
Inc.163  In Dresser, the employer provided affidavits demonstrating the 
unavailability of witnesses.164  Both the manager of quality control and 
inspection supervisor died during the pendency of litigation, and the employer 
last heard of the plant manager leaving the country and heading to Libya.165  
Because these three individuals possessed pertinent information no other 
member of Dresser Industries could preserve, the court ruled in favor of the 
employer.166 
Dresser also argued that, while it preserved documentation in regard to the 
charging employee’s personnel records, it did not keep any additional records 
past its internal five-year retention policy.167  The court did not fault the 
employer, determining that “[o]nce the [employer] satisf[ied] the EEOC’s record 
retention requirement . . . they should not be punished for failing to exceed 
standards mandated by the very Commission that promulgated them.”168 
Alternatively, the court and an employer may differ on how instrumental a 
witness may be to a laches defense.  The employer in PBM Graphics, Inc. cited 
specific examples of witness unavailability after a six-year delay.169  Of the 
twelve employees at issue, only two remained with the company.170  Of the 
management officers, two had died.171  Only one upper-management employee 
remained with the company during the time period in question.172 Because the 
EEOC had not fully developed its case, which could shift the burden of proof 
                                                 
 161. See EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1979) 
(“ [G]eneralized allegation[s] of harm from the passage of time does not amount to a showing of 
prejudice.”). 
 162. Id. 
 163. 668 F.2d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir. 1982) (“The tortoise-like speed with which the [EEOC] 
handled the enforcement action of this T itle VII case has cost it  the race.”). 
 164. Id. at  1203. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at  1201. 
 167. Id. at  1204. 
 168. Id. 
 169. EEOC v. PBM Graphics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 334, 365 –66 (M.D.N.C. 
2012); see Dresser Indus., Inc., 668 F. 2d at 1200–04. 
 170. PBM Graphics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d at 365. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at  366. 
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from the government to the employee, it was unclear how witness unavailability 
specifically affected the employer.173 
PBM Graphics unfortunately relied on the Dresser employer’s more specific 
witness need theory.174  The question of discriminatory hiring and firing in 
Dresser rested on an individual hiring manager’s actions and recollections.175  
PBM Graphics did not cite a specific need for any of the eight upper 
management employees, only relying on the prejudice of time that left one 
remaining management position employee available.176  Although the court did 
not decide on a threshold, it did call prejudice a “threshold issue” in 
differentiating witness need from Dresser.177 
Evidence that no one at the company was present during the discriminatory 
acts is also concrete evidence of prejudice, and a deceased employee inherently 
causes testimony issues.178 As analyzed by the court in EEOC v. Martin 
Processing, Inc., two employees may be in charge of a charging party’s hiring 
and alleged discriminatory firing, and if one is deceased, there are clearly 
testimonial issues that may hinder an employer’s defense.179  However, when 
none of the current supervisors had any connection with the employment of the 
charging employees, the employer cannot cite specific evidentiary prejudice.180  
If an employer cites a deceased witness, but the deceased witness’s testimony is 
neither crucial and can be “replaced” by crucial, living witnesses, the court w ill 
rule against prejudice.181 
The Fourth Circuit faced the opportunity to calm confusion regarding witness 
and record retention policies in EEOC v. Propak Logistics, Inc.,182 but left the 
availability of the use of laches as an affirmative defense at the trial level.183  The 
EEOC initiated the lawsuit against Propak six and a half years after a former 
employee filed a discrimination claim.184  Specifically, the claim stated that 
Propak discriminated against a class of non-Hispanic individuals at one of its 
North Carolina facilities.185  The district court ruled in favor of the defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment, stating, “there were significant periods when the 
EEOC took little or no action toward completing the investigation.”186  The court 
                                                 
 173. Id. at  366–67. 
 174. Id. at  367–68. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at  365–66. 
 177. Id. at  366–68. 
 178. E.g., EEOC v. Martin Processing, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 227, 230–32 (W.D. Va. 1982). 
 179. Id. at  230–32. 
 180. Id. at  230. 
 181. Id. at  232–33. 
 182. 746 F.3d 145, 147 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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 184. Id. at  148. 
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stated that the defendant experienced prejudice because certain key witnesses 
were no longer available, and, if they were available, would encounter “faded 
memories” of the events at question.187 
Additionally, personnel records had been destroyed in accordance with 
Propak’s routine of destroying personnel files after a certain time.188  The Fourth 
Circuit ruled against the EEOC on procedural grounds, and did not discuss the 
availability of the use of laches because the EEOC abandoned the argument 
when it abandoned a prior summary judgment order.189  The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s ruling in favor of the defendant’s request for attorney 
fees.190  Under the clear error standard of review, the Fourth Circuit failed to 
state the trial court clearly erred with regard to the laches argument.191 
D. Employers Cannot Depend on EEOC Backlog to Stop Back Pay Damages 
from Accruing 
An employer’s reality in minimizing the ticking back pay clock in pursuit of 
a laches defense rests on the fact that the hybrid public and private rights the 
EEOC asserts predominately rest in its sovereign foundation.192  Defendants 
cannot rely on the EEOC’s administrative delays, whether in the conciliation 
process or even pre-litigation phase, to automatically halt back pay.193  Neither 
does an employer have firm case law to determine if a court will decide laches 
on either public sovereign grounds or private grounds based on loose 
thresholds.194  Although there is minimal case law of laches use in light of Waffle 
House’s holding, the issue Waffle House presents within “public” Title VII 
enforcement leaves open the door to higher monetary damages with an unknown 
judgment date.195 
When asserting a laches defense against the EEOC, the employer does not 
know whether or not they are defending against a public or private entity.196  An 
employer can, however, follow two paths.  First, an employer should analyze the 
specific prejudicial factors as described above in determining if laches is the 
                                                 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at  149–50. 
 189. Id. at  152–53. 
 190. Id. at  153. 
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 192. EEOC v. Martin Processing, 533 F. Supp. 227, 229–30. (W.D. Va. 1982). 
 193. See e.g., Propak Logistics, 746 F.3d at 148; EEOC v. PBM Graphics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 
2d 334, 365 (M.D.N.C. 2012); EEOC v. SWMW Mgmt., Inc., No. CV-08-0946-PHX-GMS, 2009 
WL 1097543, *6–7 (D. Ariz. April 22, 2009). 
 194. See e.g., Propak Logistics, 746 F.3d at 151–52; PBM Graphics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d at 
368–69; SWMW Mgmt., Inc., 2009 WL 109753, at *14 n.2. 
 195. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295–98 (2002) (finding that the EEOC acts 
as more than just a “proxy” when litigating on behalf of an employee). 
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appropriate remedy.197  The causal link between faded memories, lost witnesses, 
and lost documents must strongly correlate to the present prejudice an employer 
faces; a court will easily cut the cord to this defense if this does not exist.198 
More importantly, an employer cannot self-inflict prejudice.199  Record-
retention policies must be crafted in a way that both follows the EEOC’s 
requirements, but that also accounts for inevitable litigation that any employer 
could face, and the inevitable pre-litigation time period backlog may produce.200  
A subpoena could appear almost seven years after the initial EEOC filing,  
initiating potential prejudice under the second prong of laches.201 
It is impractical for an employer to keep years upon years of employee 
records, especially when it is more common for employees to sign arbitration 
agreements that limit back pay of a private individual.202  Although arbitration 
agreements are not the focus of this Note, Waffle House’s open issue does affect, 
for better or for worse, a laches defense.203  Without clear-cut prejudicial 
evidence, an employer should present its case against the EEOC as it would 
against the United States litigating in its sovereign capacity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The judicial discretion of a “just result” a court may prescribe an employer 
fails to rely on a guiding principle.204  Whether the EEOC acts as an entity 
protecting private rights or as the arm of the sovereign government in 
discrimination cases remains to be decided by the courts.205  Both employers and 
employees remain in limbo and both are stuck relying on the judicial opinions 
of past discrimination cases and constitutional scholars who abstractly debate an 
entity’s sovereignty.  The use of laches in this context, or other acts where 
Congress imposes no statute of limitations, may easily be cemented by either 
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future judicial opinion or policy venture.206   Until then, the EEOC must continue 
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